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RESUMEN 
Recientemente, Jessica Wilson ha elaborado una versión más sofisticada de la ob-
jeción según la cual el escepticismo cartesiano se auto-destruye. Wilson defiende que 
afirmar el escepticismo cartesiano conduce a un regreso vicioso imparable. La manera de 
evitarlo es no seguirle el juego al escéptico cartesiano, detener el regreso desde el princi-
pio, tras la aseveración garantizada de que hay un mundo externo. Aquí ofrecemos tres razo-
nes para decir que la objeción no funciona: primero, el escéptico no tiene por qué aceptar 
la caracterización de la tesis escéptica que da Wilson, con lo que no tiene por qué embar-
carse en un regreso; segundo, incluso si el escéptico se comprometiera con un regreso, 
ello no socavaría el escepticismo de la manera que Wilson piensa; y tercero, el recurso al 
escepticismo sobre los estados mentales, que es necesario para generar los pasos segundo 
y sucesivos del regreso, no está justificado. 
 
PALABRAS CLAVE: escepticismo cartesiano, objeción de la auto-destrucción, escepticismo sobre los estados 
mentales. 
 
ABSTRACT 
Jessica Wilson has recently offered a more sophisticated version of the self-defeat 
objection to Cartesian scepticism. She argues that the assertion of Cartesian scepticism 
results in an unstable vicious regress. The way out of the regress is to not engage with the 
Cartesian sceptic at all, to stop the regress before it starts, at the warranted assertion that 
the external world exists. We offer three reasons why this objection fails: first, the sceptic 
need not accept Wilson’s characterization of the sceptical thesis and thus need not start 
her regress; second, even if she did commit to the regress, it would not undermine scep-
ticism in the way Wilson envisages; and third, the appeal to mental state scepticism which 
is necessary to generate the second and subsequent steps in the regress is not justified. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The Cartesian sceptic argues that we cannot, and therefore do not, 
know anything.1 A simplistic response is to say that this is self-defeating: 
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either you know the sceptical claim and thus know something, rendering it 
false, or you do not know it and thus we have been given no reason to give 
up our dogmatism. The natural response to such an objection is to limit the 
scope of the sceptical claim to knowledge of the external world. This is 
usually done by showing that the sceptical argument, drawing upon the 
possibility that we are undetectably deceived about the external world, has 
this limitation built in. In slogan form: sceptical scenarios do not undermine 
our ability to know the sceptical claim.2  
Jessica Wilson has recently offered a more sophisticated version of 
the self-defeat objection. She argues that the assertion of Cartesian scepti-
cism results in an unstable vicious regress. The way out of the regress is to 
not engage with the Cartesian sceptic at all, to stop the regress before it 
starts, at the warranted assertion that the external world exists. In this short pa-
per we offer three reasons why this objection fails: firstly, the sceptic need 
not accept Wilson’s characterization of the sceptical thesis and thus need 
not start her regress; secondly, even if she did commit to the regress, it 
would not undermine scepticism in the way Wilson envisages; and thirdly, 
the appeal to mental state scepticism which is necessary to generate the 
second and subsequent steps in the regress is not justified. 
 
 
I. WILSON’S REGRESS 
 
Wilson begins by asking whether the external world exists, ‘as it so 
concretely seems’ [Wilson (2012), p. 668]. Perhaps not, she goes on, for 
the Cartesian sceptic says that we might be systematically deceived by an 
evil demon, or be brains in vats, in which case everything would seem to 
us exactly as it does seem, whilst all of our beliefs about the external world 
would be false. Before I meet the sceptic, I warrantedly assert that the exter-
nal world exists. Then, I read Descartes’ first Meditation and I come to have 
a sceptical attitude towards the truth of the proposition that the external 
world exists. Now all I can warrantedly assert is the claim that I am sceptical 
whether3 the external world exists: I cannot warrantedly assert that the external 
world does exist, nor can I warrantedly assert that the external world does not ex-
ist. This is the position of Wilson’s Cartesian sceptic. Next I meet the men-
tal state sceptic and she makes the same move as made by the Cartesian 
sceptic, she casts doubt on the warranted assertability of my current claim 
— the claim that I am sceptical whether the external world exists. So I come to 
have a sceptical attitude towards whether I have a sceptical attitude to-
wards the proposition that the external world exists, and all I can warrantedly 
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assert is the claim that I am sceptical whether I am sceptical whether the external 
world exists, I cannot assert that I am sceptical whether the external world exists, 
nor can I assert that I am not sceptical whether the external world exists. The idea 
is that if by contemplation of Cartesian scenarios, I am moved to scepti-
cism about the truth of the proposition that the external world exists, then via 
that same contemplation, I ought also to be moved to scepticism about 
whether I am sceptical whether the external world exists. But why stop 
there? Now the mental state sceptic mounts the same attack on my new 
assertion, and so it goes on, ad infinitum: 
 
To start: 
A (the external world exists) 
 
At step 1 (after my encounter with the external world skeptic): 
 
A (S (the external world exists)) and 
Not-A (the external world exists) and 
Not-A (not-the external world exists) 
 
At step 2 (after my encounter with the mental state skeptic): 
 
A (S (S (the external world exists))) and  
Not-A (S (the external world exists)) and 
Not-A (not-S (the external world exists)) 
 
At step 3 (after another encounter with the mental state skeptic): 
 
A (S (S (S (the external world exists)))) and  
Not-A (S (S (the external world exists))) and 
Not-A (not-S (S (the external world exists))) 
 
[Wilson (2012), p. 670] 
 
What is to be done? Well, Wilson claims that the regress is ‘psychologi-
cally vicious – it is rationally confounding – and so it must be stopped’ 
[Wilson (2012), p. 671]. She also claims that the stopping place we sug-
gest must be a principled one (‘we cannot just draw the line at the 39th 
step’ [Wilson (2012), p. 671]). As an aside, we wonder why we could not 
draw the line at the 39th step? This does not need to be arbitrary: per-
haps it is impossible for humans to understand claims with more than a 
certain level of iterated logical operators, and this hits at the 39th step. If 
that were right, we would have the principled stopping place Wilson de-
sires. The suggestion here is not that this is right, that humans really are 
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only able to understand up to 39 iterations, much more would need to be 
said to make that claim remotely plausible. Rather our point is that there 
might be a step at which humans are unable to understand, and if this step 
were identifiable, this would provide a stopping place just as principled 
as Wilson’s but which comes later than the one she recommends. Thus a 
stopping point after the first step need not be arbitrary. 
However, we disagree with the claim that an assertion of the Carte-
sian sceptic’s position starts one on this regress. Rather, the Cartesian 
need not assert the problematic first step that supposedly makes her po-
sition objectionable. Second, even if Wilson is right about the first step, 
the sceptic should not treat the resulting regress as an objection. Third, 
Wilson has not made the case that Cartesian scepticism about mental 
states is coherent and there are reasons to deny that it is, so the regress 
might even be stopped at the second step. We detail these three lines of 
response in the next three sections. 
 
 
II. AVOID THE REGRESS: ASSERT WHAT YOU DO NOT KNOW 
 
Wilson claims that ‘as a result of contemplation of the Cartesian sce-
narios’, one might become sceptical about whether the external world ex-
ists [Wilson (2012), p. 668]. I am a Cartesian sceptic, and I assert that I am 
sceptical whether the external world exists, where being sceptical whether p con-
sists in having a distinctive propositional attitude towards p (presumably 
one which is inconsistent with both believing p and believing not-p). This 
is bad news since this assertion leads to a rationally confounding, vicious, 
unstable regress. 
So here is the first option for the Cartesian sceptic: state your posi-
tion without asserting that [you are] sceptical whether the external world exists. 
We take it that this is not an ad-hoc patch, rather, the conclusion of the 
Cartesian sceptic’s argument is not that one ought to be sceptical about the 
external world existing, it is that one cannot know whether the external 
world exists (or some ordinary knowledge proposition which entails the 
external world existing). If the argument is sound and the premises 
known, then the Cartesian sceptic knows that she cannot know whether 
the external world exists.4 
While concentrating on another issue in a footnote, Wilson nicely 
makes the obverse of the move we are making:  
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The distinction between Cartesian and Pyrrhonian scepticism is often more 
specifically posed in terms of knowledge or some other ‘pro-attitude’ re-
quired for knowledge (such that, e.g., the Cartesian skeptic maintains, while 
the Pyrrhonian skeptic denies, that we can know that we cannot know 
whether the external world exists). In order to remain neutral about what 
epistemic state is at issue in the meta-level claim, I couch the distinction in 
terms of the warranted assertability (or not) of scepticism about the object-
level claim [Wilson (2012), p. 670, fn. 7]. 
 
Here the phrase ‘scepticism about the object-level claim’ must refer to 
‘that we cannot know whether the external world exists’, which is exactly 
what we think the Cartesian should be claiming, not that she is in the 
mental state of doubting whether the external world exists.5 
For the sake of exposition, we will say that the Cartesian sceptic’s 
position is that I know that I do not know whether the external world ex-
ists (rather than I cannot know). Since my being unable to know whether 
p entails my not knowing whether p, we think this move is permissible. 
Let us then start afresh with what the Cartesian sceptic is really commit-
ted to, and see how an alternative regress based on this might work. 
 
To start: 
 
A (the external world exists) 
 
This is my position before I engage with the Cartesian sceptic, I warrant-
edly assert that the external world exists, presumably on the basis of my per-
ceptual evidence. After I engage with the Cartesian sceptic, I move to the 
claim that I do not know whether the external world exists. This is the position 
of the Cartesian sceptic. 
 
At step 1 (after my encounter with the external world sceptic): 
A (~K (the external world exists))  
 
Note that, as a result of engaging with the Cartesian sceptic, I can move 
to step 1 without asserting that I am sceptical whether the external world exists. 
I am not asserting that I have a mental state of scepticism but that whatever men-
tal states I have do not constitute knowledge. Now let us try to start an equiva-
lent regress. The former regress got started via the claim that any reasons 
one has for moving from the first line to step 1, should also function as 
reasons for one moving from step 1 to step 2, so the conclusion at step 2 
should have the same form. Thus: 
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At step 2 (after my encounter with the mental state sceptic): 
A (~K (~K (the external world exists))) 
 
At step 3 (after my second encounter with the mental state sceptic):  
A (~K (~K (~K (the external world exists)))) 
 
At step 4 
 (after my third encounter with the mental state sceptic):  
A (~K (~K (~K (~K (the external world exists))))) 
 
Is this ‘an unstable iteration of psychological attitudes’ [Wilson (2012), p. 
671]? Surely not. At step 1 I certainly no longer assert what I asserted 
previously, but nor do I assert its negation. Instead I assert a different 
proposition, namely that I do not know what I previously asserted, and similar-
ly for each further step. This looks like the defeasibility of warranted as-
sertability in action. Consider an analogy: We consider some data and 
assert theory A. Then we consider some more data and no longer assert 
A but instead assert (incompatible) theory B. Then we consider some 
more data and no longer assert B but instead assert (incompatible) theory 
C. And thus does science progress. 
The apparent instability that Wilson perceives comes from framing 
each sceptical claim as the positive assertion that I possess certain mental 
states, namely sceptical attitudes. That does seem to lead to all sorts of 
muddles which it might be good to stop. But in fact, at each step what 
the sceptic concludes, and thus asserts, is merely a negative claim about 
the epistemic status of what came before: it is not known. 
 
 
III. EMBRACE THE REGRESS: IT NEED NOT BE STOPPED 
 
In this section we suggest that should the Cartesian sceptic wish to 
assert that she is sceptical whether the external world exists, and granting to Wil-
son that that starts a vicious regress, this does not constitute an objection 
to such a sceptic. 
Let us grant to Wilson that at step 1, having engaged with the Car-
tesian sceptic, my position is now that I am sceptical whether the external 
world exists. Let us also grant that this assertion results in a rationally con-
founding regress. I realise that the sequence is unbounded and I will not 
be able to reach a stable belief. Here is our first point about this: my be-
ing unable to reach a stable belief is only an objection to the Cartesian 
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sceptic if what she is up to is trying to persuade me to accept a theory. 
But, as we saw in section two, the Cartesian is only trying to tell me that I 
cannot (and so do not) have knowledge whether the external world exists 
(and, if you allow the move to mental state scepticism, that I cannot (and 
so do not) have knowledge of the mental state I am in). So we learn from 
Wilson that claiming that I am sceptical whether the external world exists means 
that I cannot have a stable belief system. But that point does not under-
mine the Cartesian sceptic’s claim that knowledge of a certain sort is im-
possible! 
To be sure, the consequence of engaging with the Cartesian sceptic 
and moving to the first step is psychologically disastrous. But that is ac-
ceptable for the sceptic: if it turns out that there is no stable position of 
scepticism, so what? There is no stable position of non-scepticism either, 
because the sceptic can still argue that the move to the first step is ra-
tionally required. So, even if we grant for the sake of argument that the 
sceptic’s end place is the claim that I am sceptical whether the external world 
exists, and we grant that this leads the sceptic into a regress, thus under-
mining the warrant of her conclusion, this is not yet an objection to the 
sceptic’s position. We see no reason why the sceptic would not simply 
throw up her hands and say ‘OK, there is no warranted position of scep-
ticism, but there is no warranted position of non-scepticism either! Con-
templation of the sceptical scenario made I know whether the external world 
exists unassertable. Now I learn that so too is the claim that I am sceptical 
whether the external world exists. That clearly does not help the non-sceptic, 
the path to madness has already begun’.6 
Why think that all vicious regresses should be stopped, that the sight 
of an impending regress should lead us to reject the argument for the 
first step? One might be persuaded that it is desirable that vicious regress-
es are stopped, but it is only the case that they rationally ought to be 
stopped if they violate some norm of reasoning, such as the principle of 
non-contradiction. The reason for blocking an argument which commits 
us to contradictions is a logical rule, whereas the reason (if we have one) 
for blocking Wilson’s regress is psychological: it is confounding of our abil-
ity to reason. This means that any reason for stopping before step 1 is 
merely pragmatic. 
We do not see how something’s being rationally confounding is 
supposed to gain traction with the Cartesian sceptic. At most, it seems to 
us, Wilson has shown that scepticism leads to madness, a regress of un-
stable attitudes, but this is a far cry from showing that Cartesian scepti-
cism is wrong. It shows only that we have pragmatic reasons to pretend 
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we can refute the Cartesian sceptic, even though we cannot. Perhaps if 
one’s objective was not to refute the sceptic but merely to find adequate 
grounds within one’s rational practices to continue with such practices 
despite the sceptical arguments, then this would suffice.7 But then, con-
trary to its advertisement, Wilson’s regress would not be an argument 
against scepticism but an argument for dogmatism as usual. 
 
 
IV. BLOCK THE REGRESS: REJECT SCEPTICISM ABOUT MENTAL STATES 
 
In the preceding two sections we have argued that the regress is not 
threatening to Cartesian scepticism, firstly by showing that the Cartesian 
sceptic should not accept the formulation of step 1 in terms of a state of 
doubting and that when correctly formulated, the resulting regress is not 
vicious, and then by showing that even if she did accept step 1, the vicious 
nature of the regress would not undermine scepticism but support it. We 
now turn to step 2 and show that the appeal to sceptical scenarios at this 
stage does not achieve the mental state scepticism Wilson requires. 
Wilson takes the application of sceptical scenarios to one’s mental 
states to be obvious and suggests that Descartes himself accepted the 
possibility of mental state scepticism. She provides the following two 
quotations to support this interpretation of Descartes: ‘[M]any people do 
not know themselves what they believe, since believing something and 
knowing that one believes it are different acts of thinking, and the one 
often occurs without the other’ [Discourse on Method, cited in Wilson 
(2012), p. 669, fn. 3; AT VI 23]; ‘For experience shows that those who 
are the most strongly agitated by their passions are not those who know 
them best’ [Passions, cited in Wilson (2012), p. 669, fn. 3; AT XI 349-350]. 
However, it is not clear from this material that Descartes did accept the 
possibility of mental state scepticism. The quotations provided only sug-
gest that Descartes noted the difference between having the belief that p, 
and having the second order belief that one believes that p, and that these 
states are independent. 
Furthermore, Descartes clearly did not accept mental state scepti-
cism. After the cogito Descartes vows to meditate and ‘subtract anything 
capable of being weakened […] so that what is left at the end may be ex-
actly and only what is certain and unshakeable’ [AT VII 25; (1984), p. 17]. 
After this subtraction, we get an ‘I’ who ‘understands some things, who af-
firms that this one thing is true, denies everything else, desires to know 
more, is unwilling to be deceived, imagines many things even involun-
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tarily, and is aware of many things which apparently come from the 
senses? Are not all these things just as true as the fact that I exist, even if 
I am asleep all the time, and even if he who created me is doing all he 
can to deceive me?’ [AT VII 28-29; (1984), p. 19]. It is hard to reconcile 
this with mental state scepticism, but this is precisely what Wilson’s men-
tal state sceptic needs: I must be sceptical about my attitude of being 
sceptical whether the external world exists. 
We need to be persuaded that someone who accepts Cartesian scep-
ticism about the external world should also accept Cartesian scepticism 
about mental states. What exactly does the mental state sceptic say to us at 
step 2? The first level sceptic has just argued (let H be the sceptical hy-
pothesis and P the external world proposition): ~K(~H), (~K(~H)→ 
~K(P)), therefore ~K(P).8 Where could the mental state sceptic’s deceiver 
get traction on this? Which one of the premises might be a deception 
brought on by an evil demon? Suppose the first: if this is a deception 
then K(~H), and I could only know that I am not being undetectably 
deceived about the external world if such deception was impossible or 
ruled out by something else I know, such as the existence of a benign 
God. The problem now is that the mental state sceptic has to create a 
scenario in which I am undetectably deceived that undetectable decep-
tion is possible.9 So the mental state sceptic must address the second 
premise and show that it is possible that, appearances to the contrary, 
~(~K(~H)→~K(P)) and thus it is possible I am deceived about the sec-
ond premise. That deception requires a scenario in which the possibility 
of undetectable deception about P does not undermine knowledge that 
P, which is, of course, hardly a sceptical scenario. 
 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper, we have presented Wilson’s regress argument against 
Cartesian scepticism and offered three avenues of response. We first 
suggested that the Cartesian sceptic can get to her desired conclusion 
without having to go via the assertion that she is sceptical whether the ex-
ternal world exists. This generates an alternative regress which is not unsta-
ble and may not even get started. Next, we argued that if the Cartesian 
sceptic does want to assert that she is sceptical whether the external world ex-
ists, she can go ahead and do so. Wilson argues that the regress generated 
by the assertion that one is sceptical whether the external world exists must be 
stopped. We countered that that assertion is not one the Cartesian need 
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make, and if she does make it, whatever regress it leads to is not in need 
of stopping. Finally, we argued that Wilson is too quick at step 2 and that 
hypotheses of deception do not generate the mental state scepticism she 
needs at that point. So, yet another attempt to show that we should re-
ject Cartesian scepticism because it is somehow self-defeating fails. 
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NOTES 
 
1 We define a Cartesian sceptic as one who appeals to the possibility of mas-
sive deception, either by an evil demon, an evil scientist, or some other scenario. 
We assume that this sceptic offers such a possibility as the premise of an argument 
which concludes with a sceptical claim. Paul Noordhof has pointed out an alterna-
tive: the sceptic may want contemplation of the sceptical scenario to cause uncer-
tainty, doubt, and confusion, thereby undermining the epistemic status of what the 
subject believes. Setting aside the correctness of the assumption that knowledge re-
quires an absence of uncertainty, it seems that this sceptic is more of an epistemo-
logical bully than a philosophical opponent, so we will not address him in what 
follows. 
2 This is one point where the Cartesian and Pyrrhonian sceptic differ. Anoth-
er is over the propositional attitudes a sceptic ought to have. As Sextus Empiricus 
puts the Pyrrhonist view: 
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When we say, Sceptics do not hold beliefs, we do not take ‘belief’ in the sense in 
which some say, quite generally, that belief is acquiescing in something; for Sceptics 
assent to the feelings forced on them by appearances. [Outlines I.13; (2000), p. 6]. 
 
3 Throughout we follow Wilson in using the language of knowing whether (ra-
ther than knowing that). We assume that to know whether p is to either know p or 
know ~p, such that if p is true, knowing that p and knowing whether p are equivalent. 
Someone in a state of ignorance about p will therefore express themselves as want-
ing to know whether p. But an observer who knows p is true might express this as 
their wanting to know that p, because the only way for them to know whether p 
would be by knowing that p. 
4 It might be pointed out that Descartes’ solution to the sceptical problem 
involves, in Meditation II, a commitment to knowing of himself that he is 
doubting, which seems to support Wilson’s reading of the conclusion of the 
Cartesian arguments. Given that Descartes’ use of sceptical arguments is meth-
odological, we should distinguish the conclusion of the argument – which he 
does not accept – from the mental state he is in after running through the argu-
ments. He has an apparently sound argument to the conclusion that he cannot 
know anything about the external world. He does not want to accept the conclu-
sion, so the appropriate state of mind is temporary, methodological doubt (‘dubi-
tare’ was the Stephanus translation of Sextus’ ‘aporia’). Doubt is thus not the 
conclusion of the sceptical arguments Descartes provides but their effect upon him, 
an effect he introspects in Meditation II. 
5 Yuval Avnur makes a similar point by distinguishing a Practicing Sceptic, 
who doubts, from a Theoretical Sceptic, who ‘holds that we should be Practicing 
sceptics’ [Avnur (2016, p. 81]. Our Theoretical sceptic merely asserts that she can-
not know and leaves the normative claims to the prescriptively inclined. 
6 A Pyrrhonian sceptic would be one who achieved tranquillity, not insanity, 
when faced with this problem. So at best Wilson has converted the Cartesian scep-
tic to Pyrrhonism. 
7 Thanks to Christopher Jay for this point. 
8 We follow Duncan Pritchard in opting for the modus ponens formulation of 
the sceptic’s argument here [(2002), p. 217]. 
9 Relativizing the deceptions to subject matters, viz. my mental states and the 
external world, makes clear that step 2 requires additional arguments over and 
above what was needed for step 1. 
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